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Document 1

Filed 12/06/2007

E-filing

Name FLOWERS	ALVIN	S.	
(Last)	(First)	(Initial)	
Prisoner Number T-91			
Institutional Address S	alinas valley st	TATE PRISON, FAC. B, BLDG	1 - 131
P.O. BOX 1050, SO	LEDAD, Californi	a 93969-1050	
<u> </u>	UNITED STAT NORTHERN DIS	TES DISTRICT COURT STRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
Alvin Scott Flower		TT 7 30 10	
(Enter the full name of plaintiff	****	V 07	3184
	'S.	(To be provided by the	e clerk of court)
Michael Evans, War	rden, ET, AL	PETITION FOR OF HABEAS CO	
			(PR
And the Control of th			·
(Enter the full name of respond	ent(s) or jailor in this action	i) (

Read Comments Carefully Before Filling In

When and Where to File

You should file in the Northern District if you were convicted and sentenced in one of these counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Del Norte, Humboldt, Lake, Marin, Mendocino, Monterey, Napa, San Benito, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Francisco, San Mateo and Sonoma. You should also file in this district if you are challenging the manner in which your sentence is being executed, such as loss of good time credits, and you are confined in one of these counties. Habeas L.R. 2254-3(a).

If you are challenging your conviction or sentence and you were not convicted and sentenced in one of the above-named fifteen counties, your petition will likely be transferred to the United States District Court for the district in which the state court that convicted and sentenced you is located. If you are challenging the execution of your sentence and you are not in prison in one of these counties, your petition will likely be transferred to the district court for the district that includes the institution where you are confined. Habeas L.R. 2254-3(b).

Who to Name as Respondent

l

You must name the person in whose actual custody you are. This usually means the Warden or jailor. Do not name the State of California, a city, a county or the superior court of the county in which you are imprisoned or by whom you were convicted and sentenced. These are not proper respondents.

If you are not presently in custody pursuant to the state judgment against which you seek relief but may be subject to such custody in the future (e.g., detainers), you must name the person in whose custody you are now and the Attorney General of the state in which the judgment you seek to attack was entered.

A. INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

- 1. What sentence are you challenging in this petition?
 - (a) Name and location of court that imposed sentence (for example; Alameda County Superior Court, Oakland):

Court Location (b) Case number, if known C044333/WHC 700 6223894 (c) Date and terms of sentence April 28, 2003 (d) Are you now in custody serving this term? (Custody means being in jail, on parole or probation, etc.) Where? Salinas Valley State Prison, Soledad, California Name of Institution: Salinas Valley State Prison Address: 31625 Why 101, Soledad, California

2. For what crime were you given this sentence? (If your petition challenges a sentence for more than one crime, list each crime separately using Penal Code numbers if known. If you are challenging more than one sentence, you should file a different petition for each sentence.)

26 Penal Code § 191.5, Veh. Code § 23153(a) & (b)

1	3. Did you have any of the following?
2	Arraignment: Yes X No
3	Preliminary Hearing: Yes X No
4	Motion to Suppress: Yes No
5	4. How did you plead?
6	Guilty Not Guilty _ Nolo Contendere
7	Any other plea (specify)
8	5. If you went to trial, what kind of trial did you have?
9	Jury Judge alone Judge alone on a transcript
10	6. Did you testify at your trial? Yes No _X
11	7. Did you have an attorney at the following proceedings:
12	(a) Arraignment Yes _X No
13	(b) Preliminary hearing Yes X No
14	(c) Time of plea Yes X No
15	(d) Trial Yes X No
16	(e) Sentencing Yes _X_ No
17	(f) Appeal Yes _X_ No
18	(g) Other post-conviction proceeding Yes X No
19	8. Did you appeal your conviction? Yes _✓ No
20	(a) If you did, to what court(s) did you appeal?
21	Court of Appeal Yes X No
22	Year: 2003 Result: Denced
23	Supreme Court of California Yes X No
24	Year: 2004 Result: Donced
25	Any other court Yes K No
26	Year: 2006 Result: Jened
27	
28	(b) If you appealed, were the grounds the same as those that you are raising in th

1		petition?	Yes	No_X_
2	(c)	Was there an opinion?	Yes	NoK_
3	(d)	Did you seek permission to	file a late appeal under Ru	ale 31(a)?
4	-		Yes <u>×</u>	No
5		If you did, give the name of	the court and the result:	
6		Sup. Ct. o	2 - Habeas C	Olyus - Cour
7		Sup. CT. o	Ca Supreme	Court-Donied
8	9. Other than appeals	, have you previously filed any	y petitions, applications or	motions with respect to
9	this conviction in any		Yes <u>×</u>	
10		previously filed a petition for		
11	challenged the same c	onviction you are challenging	now and if that petition wa	as denied or dismissed
12		ust first file a motion in the Un		
13	for an order authorizit	ng the district court to consider	this petition. You may n	ot file a second or
14	subsequent federal ha	beas petition without first obta	ining such an order from t	the Ninth Circuit. 28
15	U.S.C. §§ 2244(b).]			
16	• •	sought relief in any proceedir		
17	quest	ions for each proceeding. Att	ach extra paper if you nee	ed more space.
18	I.	Name of Court: Suite	Lion Could	Placel Co.
19		Type of Proceeding:	ect of Haba	as Colpus
20		Grounds raised (Be brief bu	ut specific):	
21		a. Wrong July	y Charged.	and Carricled
22		b. <u>I.A.C.</u>	•	
23		c. Speedy	1 real	
24		d. Teral Court	House of	Wisceelian -
25		Result: Deved	Date	of Result: 4/06
26	II.	Name of Court: Caly	Garria Court	of wheate
27		Type of Proceeding:	Ha seas	- Compas
28		Grounds raised (Be brief b	ut specific):	
	LT .			

PET FOR WRIT OF HAB. CORPUS

1		a. Same as Above
2	i	b
3		c
4		d
5		Pecult: Ve Se d Date of Result: 12/06
6]	II. Name of Court: California Supreme Court
7		Type of Proceeding: ON Habeas Corpus
8		Grounds raised (Be brief but specific):
9		a. SAns as Above
10		b
11		c
12		d
13		Result: Date of Result: 10 / 07
14	1	V. Name of Court:
15		Type of Proceeding:
16		Grounds raised (Be brief but specific):
17		a
18		b
19		Ç
20		d
21		Result:Date of Result:
22	(b) I	s any petition, appeal or other post-conviction proceeding now pending in any court?
23		Yes No
24	1	Pame and location of court:
25	B. GROUNDS	
26		fly every reason that you believe you are being confined unlawfully. Give facts to
27		n. For example, what legal right or privilege were you denied? What happened?
28	Who made the en	ror? Avoid legal arguments with numerous case citations. Attach extra paper if you
	PET. FOR WRI	C OF HAB. CORPUS - 5 -

1	need more space. Answer the same questions for each claim.
2	[Note: You must present ALL your claims in your first federal habeas petition. Subsequent
3	petitions may be dismissed without review on the merits. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b); McCleskey v. Zant,
4	499 U.S. 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991).]
5	Claim One: Petitioner Wrongfully Charged and
6	Cossicted (U.S. CA. 14 Amend.)
7	Supporting Facts:
8	Rogers V. Peck (1905) 199 U.S. 425
9	Gaeland y Washington (1914) 232 U.S. 642
6	JACKSON V Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307
1	Claim Two: To offective Assistance of Countel
2	(CL-S. CA - 6 Amend.)
3	Supporting Facts:
4	Paople v Pope 23 CAI 3d. 412 (1979)
5	Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668
6	
7	Claim Three: Speedy Thial (USCA. 6 Armend
8	
9	Supporting Facts:
0	United States y boggett 505 U.S. 651
1	Barker v Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514
2	United States & Marcos (1971) 404 U.S. 307
3	If any of these grounds was not previously presented to any other court, state briefly which
24	grounds were not presented and why:
25	
26	
27	
8.	
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1 2 3 4 5	List, by name and citation only, any cases that you think are close factually to yours so that they are an example of the error you believe occurred in your case. Do not discuss the holding or reasoning of these cases:			
6	Ves No X			
7	Do you have an attorney for this petition?			
8	If you do, give the name and address of your attorney:			
9	WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the Court grant petitioner relief to which s/he may be entitled in			
10	WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the Court grant petitioner reflect to what the foregoing is true and correct.			
11	this proceeding. I verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.			
12	Executed on 1/-17-07 Whinton			
13	Executed on 77 7 C Signature of Petitioner Date			
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16 17				
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16 17 18	(Rev. 6/02)			
16 17 18 19	(Rev. 6/02)			
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7 8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS)
11	Plaintiff,) CASE NO
12	VS. PRISONER'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED
13	Michael Evans, Warden, ET, AL
14	Defendant.
15	
16	I, Alvin Scott Flowers, declare, under penalty of perjury that I am the plaintiff in
17	the above entitled case and that the information I offer throughout this application is true and correct.
18	I offer this application in support of my request to proceed without being required to prepay the full
19	amount of fees, costs or give security. I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the
20	costs of this action or give security, and that I believe that I am entitled to relief.
21	In support of this application, I provide the following information:
22	1. Are you presently employed? Yes No
23	If your answer is "yes," state both your gross and net salary or wages per month, and give the name
24	and address of your employer:
25	Gross: Net:
26	Employer:
27	contact and the amount of the gross and net salary
28	If the answer is "no," state the date of last employment and the amount of the gross and net salary

		er month which you received. (If you are prior to imprisonment.)	
curb	Oymem	prior to impression,	
2.	Have	e you received, within the past twelve (12) r	nonths, any money from any of the followi
sour		•	
30.00	a.	Business, Profession or	Yes No _K
		self employment	
	b.	Income from stocks, bonds,	Yes No <u></u> ★
		or royalties?	
	C.	Rent payments?	Yes No _X
	d.	Pensions, annuities, or	Yes No <u>×</u>
		life insurance payments?	
	e.	Federal or State welfare payments,	Yes No 💢
		Social Security or other govern-	
		ment source?	
If the	e answe	r is "yes" to any of the above, describe each	a source of money and state the amount
	ved from		
3.		you married?	Yes No _X_
Spou	ise's Ful	I Name: Name:	
Spou	ise's Pla	ce of Employment:	
		onthly Salary, Wages or Income:	
Gros	s \$	Net \$	
4.	a.	List amount you contribute to your spo	buse's support : \$

1	and indicate how much you contribute toward their support. (NOTE: For minor
2	children, list only their initials and ages. DO NOT INCLUDE THEIR NAMES.).
3	
4	
5	5. Do you own or are you buying a home? Yes NoX
6	Estimated Market Value: \$ Amount of Mortgage: \$
7	6. Do you own an automobile? Yes No _X
8	Make Year Model
9	Is it financed? YesNo _ X If so, Total due: \$
0	Monthly Payment: \$
1	7. Do you have a bank account? Yes No (Do not include account numbers.)
2	Name(s) and address(es) of bank:
3	
4	Present balance(s): \$
5	Do you own any cash? Yes No _X Amount: \$
6	Do you have any other assets? (If "yes," provide a description of each asset and its estimated
7	market value.) Yes No 🔀
8	
9	8. What are your monthly expenses?
0	Rent: \$
1	Food: \$ Ø Clothing: Ø
2	Charge Accounts:
3	Name of Account Monthly Payment Total Owed on This Acct.
4	<u>NA</u> \$\$
5	\$ \$
6	\$\$_
7	9. Do you have any other debts? (List current obligations, indicating amounts and to whom
8	they are payable. Do <u>not</u> include account numbers.) PRIS. APPLIC. TO PROC. IN FORMA
	PAUPERIS, Case No3 -

i			
2			
3	10. Does the complaint which you are seeking to file raise claims that have been presented in		
4	other lawsuits?		
5	Please list the case name(s) and number(s) of the prior lawsuit(s), and the name of the court in which		
6	they were filed.		
7	N/A		
8			
9	I consent to prison officials withdrawing from my trust account and paying to the court the		
10	initial partial filing fee and all installment payments required by the court.		
11	I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and understand		
12	that a false statement herein may result in the dismissal of my claims.		
13			
14	11-17-07 (lein / lows)		
15	DATE SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT		
16			
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27			
28	PRIS. APPLIC. TO PROC. IN FORMA		
	PAUPERIS, Case No4-		

1	
2	Case Number:
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9	CERTIFICATE OF FUNDS
10	IN
11	PRISONER'S ACCOUNT
12	·
13	I certify that attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the prisoner's trust account
14	statement showing transactions of Avia S (Gw) > for the last six months at
15	[prisoner name]
16	where (s)he is confined.
17	[name of institution]
18	I further certify that the average deposits each month to this prisoner's account for the most
19	recent 6-month period were \$ and the average balance in the prisoner's account
20	each month for the most recent 6-month period was \$
21	
22	Dated:
23	[Authorized officer of the institution]
24	
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ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS, T-91323 SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON FACILITY B, BLDG. 5 - 131 P.O. BOX 1050 SOLEDAD, CA 93960-1050

In Pro Per

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No: ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS C044333/WHC 700

VS

People of the State of Calif.) Respondent,

Petitioner,

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

BRIEF AND EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Petitioner, Alvin Scott Flowers respectfully submits this Petition to the United States District Court of the State of California, after having received denials in the Superior Court of Placer County, and the Appellate Court for the Third District, and the Supreme Court of the State of California, on his Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner, Mr. Flowers, asks the Court for review on his Writ, Case No: C044333/WHC 700 - 6223894, S152382.

The following Brief and Exhibits in support thereof for Petitioner's request for review in said petition in accordance to the California Rules of Court and in Compliance with the Supreme Court of the State of California.

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS ON HABEAS CORPUS

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ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS, T-91323 SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON FACILITY B, BLDG. 5 - 131 P.O. BOX 1050 SOLEDAD, CA 93960-1050

In Pro Per

US DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Alvin Scott Flowers
Petitioner,

VS

People of the State of Calif.
Respondent,

Case No:
C044333/WHC 700

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

BRIEF AND EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT THEREOF

1.

Petitioner, Alvin Scott Flowers, respectfully petitions
this Court on Writ of Habeas Corpus after being denied on Writ
of Habeas Corpus by the Superior Court of Placer County, and
the Court of Appeal for the Third District, and the Supreme Court
of the State of California, by this verified Petition sets fourth
the following facts and causes for the granting of this petition.

2.

Petitioner is presently unlawfully incarcerated by the Deputy
Director of the Dept. of Corrections and M. Evans, Warden of
Salinas Valley State Prison, Soledad, California. Petitioner
is serving a 30 year to life term which was unlawfully imposed
on April 28, 2003 by the Superior Court of Placer County.

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS ON HABEAS CORPUS

3.

Petitioner is filing with this District Court pursuant to a denial issued by Placer County Superior Court on October 10, 2006 in compliance with California Constitution, Article VI, Section 11.

INTRODUCTION

An information was filed on September 11, 2001 by the District Attorney of Placer County charging the Petitioner (Alvin Scott Flowers) with three felony counts. Count 1, in violation of the California Penal Code Section § 191.5, Gross Vehicular Manslaughter. Count 2, in violation of Claifornia Vehicle Code Section § 23153 subd. (a), Driving while under the influence and causing injury. Count 3, in violation of the California Vehicle Code Section § 23153 subd. (b), Driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.0890 causing injury. There were Special Allegations filed with Counts 1 and 2 that alleged Petitioner caused injury or death to one or more victims in violation of California Penal Code Section § 12022.7 subd. (a). It was further alleged Petitioner suffered three prior felony convictions in violation of California Penal Code Sections § 667 (b)(i) and § 1170.12 subd. (a)-(d). The Petitioner was also charged under California Penal Code Section § 667.5 of having suffered three prior prison terms. On November 28, 2002 the Petitioner was given a Preliminary Hearing in which the court found sufficient evidence to believe Petitioner guilty to the specific charges on the record resulting from a vehicle accident that occurred on September 5, 2001 on Westbound Highway 80. Passenger Rennea Hernandez died at the scene of the accident, Passengers Betty Daley and Jonathan Lamb were the other passengers with the Petitioner, both sustaining minor injuries. Petitioner had to be airlifted to Sutter-Roseville Medical Center.

When the accident occurred, witnesses, James Heatheock and Gary Fitch, truck-drivers that had seen the car traveling 60 -65 miles per hour while

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passing moments before the accident, Fitch continued West on Hwy. 80 through Dyack where he came upon a fire on the right shoulder of the embankment, where the vehicle had gone down the hill. Fitch noticed passenger Lamb was the first up the embankment. Fitch helped Daley up the embankment and both Lamb and Fitch carried Hernandez up the embankment. Petitioner (Flowers) was thrown from the vehicle and crawled up the embankment on his own. Eventually California Highway Patrolmen, William Weldon and Jeffrey Herbert arrived proceeding to apply medical attention to the passengers and taking statements at which time it was clear all passengers were intoxicated and had been drinking during the evening. After Highway Patrolman Weldon had taken statements of Lamb and Daley, he proceeded to come to the conclusion, Petitioner was the driver of the vehicle them stated he told Petitioner, he was under arrest and phoned ahead to the Auburn California Highway Patrol to obtain and witness a blood draw at the Medical center. Petitioner was eventually arraigned on September 11, 2001 and sentenced on April 28, 2003 under the Three Strikes Law by the Superior Court of Placer County.

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PETITIONERS SENTENCE WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE HE WAS WRONGLY CHARGED AND CONVICTED OF OFFENSES NOT NOTICED AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING

STATEMENT

On September 11, 2001, Petitioner plead NOT GUILTY to a number of charges in violation of California Penal and Vehicle Code. Penal Code Section § 191.5 as Count 1, (Gross Vehicular Manslaughter) and Vehicle Code Section § 23153 subdivisions (A) and (B), (Driving under the influence causing injury) as Count 2 and (Driving with a blood alcohol level of).08%, as Count 3, it was further alleged that there be Special Allegations charged to Petitioner in violation of California Penal Code Section § 12022.7 causing death or great bodily injury to one or more victims. It was Further alleged pursuant to a violation of California Penal Code Section § 667 (b)-(i) and § 1170.12 (a)-(d), the Petitioner has suffered three prior felony convictions. On (1/20/87) in violation of two counts of (Pen. Code § 211 from Sonoma, California and in violation of (Pen. Code § 459 from Elko, Nevada. The same violations were alleged under California Penal Code Section § 667.5 for prior prison terms.

When the District Attorney asserted the Special Allegations against the Petitioner, in specific, the charge of (Pen. Code § 12022.7), the prior felony convictions became an element of current offense, and the same element cannot be used to increase the maximum mandatory sentence which is implicated here for the offense shown on record. It is also an integral part to plead and prove the prior felony convictions as well as the Special Allegations brought against petitioner at Preliminary Hearing to ensure that there is no violation of (Pen. Code § 654) which seems to appear here. There has to be a strict standard of review in order to show the Petitioner has His Due Process Rights protected of multiple or cumulative punishment. Due Process prohibits a

criminal conviction except beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of every fact necessary to constitute a charged crime. Under California Penal Code Section § 1009 states:

"An indictment or accusation cannot be amended so as to change the offense charged nor an information so as to charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the Preliminary Hearing."

A through reading of the Preliminary Hearing Transcripts reveals no charging or proof of prior felony convictions which became elements of the current offense through Special Allegation charge, charged and presented at the Preliminary Hearing by the State. Further, there was no substantial evidence proving the Special Allegations were committed by the Petitioner and not by one of the other passengers in the vehicle. On (page 4) lines 7 thru 28 of the Preliminary Transcripts the Court as well as the District Attorney (Mr. Gini) states on record of stipulations to one count. Also on (page 5) line 5 thru 27 and on thru (page 6) of the Preliminary Transcripts and (page 7) line 1 thru 15 it is indicated of only one exhibit, and the District Attorney stipulates on line 9 of (page 7) he will file an information in regard to what is proven during the hearing. Further moving ahead to (page 118) and to (page 119), the court sets the allegation charges over for (10) ten days. On (page 120) the court sets the arraignment for trial on December 10, 2002. This Preliminary Hearing was held on November 28, 2001.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The United States Constitution guarantees every defendant the right to be advised of the nature and cause of the charges against him. This also includes any and all prior felony convictions that become elements of the current offense that are used against him as well as Special Allegations used against him. [Rogers v Pack (1905 199 U.S. 425][Garland v Washington (1914) 232 U.S. 642]. Both cases state defendants must be given adequate advisement

of the charges so they can prepare and present their defense, as well as not be surprised by evidence offered at Trial, [In Re: Hess (1955) 45 Cal. 2d. 171] [In Re: Oliver (1948) 333 U.S. 257, 273]. See also [People v Burnett 71 Cal. App. 4th 151, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 629]. As in Burnett, Petitioner was denied his Federal Due Process to be given adequate notice and nature of charges to be brought against him. Specifically, the Petitioner was found to be guilty of charged offense and Special Allegations under California Penal Code Section § 667 subd. (b)-(i) and § 1170.12 subd. (a)-(d). Under Penal Code Section § 1009 which states in relevant part, "A criminal defendant may not be convicted of an offense not shown by evidence given at the Preliminary Hearing."

What was stated in the Preliminary Hearing Transcript on (page 118) lines 19-21 and lines 27-28 and (page 119) lines 1-5 was that any Special Allegations to be filed would be within (10) ten days. That was never done or proven at Preliminary, so Petitioner could not be convicted of said charges. In testing sufficiency of evidence. "[T]he proper test to determine a claim of insufficient evidence in a felony conviction or criminal case is whether on the entire record a rational trier of fact must find Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." [Jackson v Virgina (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318, 319]. A two tier level was enunciated. First, we must resolve the issue in light of the whole record...second, we must judge whether the evidence of each of the essential elements are substantial. California Courts have further defined how reviewing Courts should determine what is substantial evidence, "substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible, and solid in value." Substantial evidence was tested, and has been reaffirmed by the California Supreme Court, the California Appellate Courts have recently cautioned that evidence and findings in regard to judgments by strictly informed as recognized in [Lilian v Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d.

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314, 320]. There are varying degrees of proof required by law. Evidence Code Section § 115...specifies these different burdens of proof. 1) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 2) Proof by clear and convincing evidence, 3) proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability. Such a test requires evidence be clear as to leave no substantial doubt, sufficiently strong enough to command unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. A preponderance of evidence standard simply requires the trier of fact is more probable than its now existence. Due Process prohibits a criminal conviction except beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of every fact necessary to constitute the charged crime. [In Re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 361-364, 90 S. Ct. 1068]
Specifically requires the Constitution guarantee that the prosecution has to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely a preponderance of the evidence.

With regard to the Petitioners prior felony convictions, the assertion by the District Attorney that the Petitioner had been convicted of any prior felony convictions was abrogated when the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of the priors at the Preliminary Hearing or prior to dismissing the jury. As has been decided on numerous occasions in this Court, when a prior conviction becomes an element of a current offense, and the defendant is tried by a jury, the exact same jury must be the decider of those priors by setting. When the Presiding Judge in the Petitioners case dismissed the jury after trial without that jury having been seated at a separate bifurcation proceeding, the Judge is essence dismissed those priors. [People v Hockersmith Cal. App. 3d. 968].

There was no evidence provided to find guilt in alleged Special

Allegations charged to Petitioner as stated in Transcripts provided. An
information was to be filed and never was. petitioner was found guilty and

convicted of those allegations. Please refer to (pages 624-626) of the Trial Transcripts. For these reasons, Petitioners sentence must be reversed and remanded back to the Trial Court for an Evidentiary Hearing (Exhibit A).

II

PETITIONERS ILLEGAL RESTRAINT IS BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 15 OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

STATEMENT

Petitioner, Alvin S. Flowers was charged with three counts and two Special Allegations. It was further alleged the Petitioner suffered three prior felony convictions under California Penal Code Section § 667 subd. (b)-(i) and § 1170.12 (a)-(d) as well as three prior prison terms under Penal Code Section 667.5 subd. (b). During Petitioners Preliminary Hearing, Defense Counsel agrees with District Attorney (Mr. Gini) on (page 4) line 7-28 about stipulations of a blood alcohol level with no evidence submitted by the District Attorney. Again on (page 5) line 4-28, Defense Counsel (Mr. Klein) agrees to find Petitioner guilty of G.B.I. to Lamb and Daley. As standard Defense strategy by Counsel, Petitioner would hope Counsel acts in a competent and reasonable potential for a meritorious defense. Petitioner was also arraigned on September 11, 2001 after being under arrest on September 5, 2001. Six (6) days from arrest to arraignment, four (4) days past the required time by the California Penal Code Section § 859 (b). Defense Counsel for the Petitioner should have filed a 995 motion for dismissal on behalf of his clients interest. Furthermore, during the trial of Petitioner, please refer to (page 615) of the Trial Transcripts lines 15-28. Defense Counsel persuades his Client to admit his priors before the jury comes back for the plea deliberation. Petitioner is somewhat pressured by the Court to dispose of his priors right then. It Specifically states that a defendants priors that are not admitted must be decided after the jury has decided the guilt phase unless the defendant admits his priors. On (page 616 thru 620) of the Trail Transcripts, the Court has Petitioner admit to his priors before the jury returns with a deliberation finding. This is a violation of petitioners Due

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Process Rights.

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The standard of review for effective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner must prove the burden of an adequate assistance of counsel. The defendant must prove counsel failed to act as a reasonable competent attorney and that defense counsels acts resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious case of defense. [People v Pope, supra, 23 Cal. 3d. pg. 425]. Defense counsel provided no assistance in failing to file 995 motion for dismissal at arraignment as well as at Preliminary Hearing where counsel allows the District Attorney to enter admissible prejudicial evidence on hearsay that is very questionable which is stated later in the Preliminary Hearing it would be ruled on later within (10) ten days. (Pages 118-119) of the Preliminary Hearing counsel's function in representing a criminal defendant is to assist defendant, and hence counsel owes client a duty of loyalty and a proper standard that is reasonably effective assistance. [Strickland v Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, (104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d. 674)] Defense Counsel also advised Petitioner to disregard a proffered deal from the District Attorneys Office of (11) eleven years. Counsel abused his authority by declining the offer before giving Petitioner his right to refuse or except the offer. That decision should be solely based on Petitioner or Defendants choice. [In Re: Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal. 4th].

It is obvious at this point, that trial counsel's defense and advice was below standard performance and if Defense Counsel had raised a more diligent approach to offer a more favorable result. It is Petitioner's opinion Counsel's deficient effort and performance where the defendants interest is and can be protected by making an argument for a more favorable outcome were not met here. From counsel's function as assistant to defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate defendants cause and more pertinent duties to

consult with defendant on important decisions and to keep defendant informed of all developments and offers made by the District Attorney. Furthermore to allow Petitioner to admit his prior felony convictions before the Judge has reached a verdict was ill-advised and Defense Counsel was not conscientious in his actions as an advocate for the defendant. Therefore, based on the order to prove prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner has shown that through the unprofessional errors, the proceedings and outcome would have been a different and more favorable outcome. Although the record is silent on why defense counsel was deficient on declining the proffered deal by the District Attorney for (11) eleven years. The record does show certain deficient tactical decisions and objections. These issues have been properly presented on appeal. There can be no satisfactory explanation why defense counsel's misconduct most certainly undermined Petitioners outcome. Petitioner's conviction must be reversed because trial counsels ineffective representation caused due prejudice. (Exhibit B)

III

PETITIONERS CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED DUE TO HIS SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT WAS VIOLATED UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

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STATEMENT

Petitioner, Alvin S. Flowers was arrested on September 5, 2001 by California Highway Patrolman (William Weldon) in Placer County. Petitioner was arraigned on September 11, 2001 with no probable cause hearing held within (48) forty eight hours as mandated by the State and Federal law. Further there was no Preliminary Hearing held within (10) ten days. Under California Constitution Article I, Section 15, a person becomes an accused when an accusatory pleading is filed, or an arrest is made, whichever comes first. Due to a series of procedural errors, Petitioner was also denied a timely Preliminary Hearing which is also mandated by law to take place no later than (60) sixty days after arraignment. This caused a fundamental miscarriage of justice to occur which caused Petitioner to suffer prejudice during trial. [Dogget 505 U.S. 651] Petitioner suffered prejudice during the period of confinement to trial while lay opinion assessment was being made by the witnesses and prosecution to combine under prejudice and weakened his case. The Court stated in <u>Dogget</u>, the Court did not require affirmative proof as to the exact prejudice. It stated [E]xcessive delay presumptively compromised the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or for that matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker Criteria, [Barker v Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 33 L.Ed. 2d. 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182], it is part of the mix of relevant facts and its importance increases with the length of delay. Because the Sixth Amendment right has been violated by the undue delay or extensive continuances in Petitioners case from arrest on September 5, 2001 to arraignment on September 11, 2001, to Preliminary Hearing on November 28,

2001 to trial on January 8, 2003, and nonetheless substantial.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A probable cause hearing must be held promptly after arrest for persons arrested without a warrant, [Gerston v Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 8681] At the latest, it must be held within (48) forty eight hours after arrest. Weekends and Holidays are not excluded from the (48) hours. The hearing may be combined with the arraignment if held within the (48) hours. [County of Riverside v Mclaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1670]. The Preliminary Hearing in Petitioner's case was not held until November 28, 2001. The Preliminary Hearing pursuant to Penal Code Section § 859 (b) must be held within (10) ten court days for a defendant who has been in custody ten or more days solely on a felony complaint. There may be continuances beyond the ten day court period only if defendant Personally waives that limit. (Pen. Code § 859 (b)). There were no time waivers made personally by the Petitioner at arraignment. If the defendant is not in custody, or if the hearing is being continued for good cause, the Preliminary Hearing must be set within (60) sixty days of arraignment or the case <u>must</u> be dismissed by the court. (Pen. Code § 859 (b)). There is prejudice in the delay of Petitioners trial and Preliminary Hearing as well as his arraignment and must be addressed by the District Court. [U.S. v Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455][Struck v U.S. (1973) 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260].

Further presenting a waiver from Petitioner on silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show that the accused was offered counsel of waiver but intelligently and understandably rejected the offer, anything less is not a waiver. By presuming a waiver of fundamental rights such as a speedy trial, from inaction is inconsistent with the courts pronouncement on waiver of constitutional rights. The Court has ruled similarly with respect to waiver

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of other rights designed to protect the accused. [Miranda v Arizona (1966) 385 U.S. 436, 475-476; 86 S.Ct. 1602] There are cases in which delay appreciably harms the defendants ability to defend himself, moreover, a defendant confined to jail prior to trial is obviously disadvantaged by delay as is a defendant released on bail, but unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion along with his own anxiety. A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, the state has the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. The factor is the prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interests of the defendants which the speedy trial right defends and was designed to protect. In this case the Petitioner along with the other passengers (witnesses) memories are all impaired by the delay to an already skewed evidentiary finding at the scene from alcohol and the accident itself. Lamb and Daileys statements were given while intoxicated at the scene, (CHP) officer Weldon's lay opinion of truth-fulness of Lamb and the undue delay of trial was extremely prejudicial in fairness to Petitioners Due Process and Speedy Trial Rights. Loss of memory isn't always reflected on the record, because what is forgotten can rarely be shown. Prosecution Witnesses who are unable to recall such facts of distant past.

Petitioner asks the Court to weigh the deficiency and difficulty to illustrate a fairness of his speedy trial rights and consider the prejudice and extraordinary circumstance of balancing his due process. Petitioner asks his judgment be reversed and remanded back to court for an evidentiary hearing.

Wherefore, Petitioner prays that this Court will order appointment of counsel to represent Petitioner regarding the matters contained herein because of the complex legal nature of the arguments made, and because Petitioner is indigent and cannot afford counsel to represent him.

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IV

THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A FINE UNDER GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 13967, SUBDIVISION (a) WITHOUT ASCERTAINING PETITIONERS ABILITY TO PAY.

A) In imposing a restitution fine under government code section 13967, subd. (a). The Trial Court must consider a defendants ability to pay.

In this matter, a (\$5,000) five thousand dollar restitution fine pursuant to Government Code Section 13967, Subd. (a) was assessed at the time Petitioner was sentenced. Government Code Section 13967, Subd. (a) as amended effective September 12, 1992 provides:

"In addition, if a person is convicted of one or more felony offenses, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine of not less than <u>Two</u> hundred dollars (\$200), subject to the defendants ability to pay it, and not more than ten thousand (\$10,000) dollars."

The emphasized language was added by the 1992 amendment because the previous version of Government Code Section 13967, Subd. (a) did not include any such language, the language changed has been changed under a new statute which evidences a requirement that trial courts determine the defendant's ability to pay a restitution fine before imposing one.

pay reflects a clear legislative intent to require the court to make a determination of ability to pay prior to its order. [People v McMahan (1992) Cal. App. 4th 740, 749]. In McMahan, this court interpreted Penal Code Section § 290.3, which provides for fines of (\$100) for a first offense, and (\$200) for a second offense, "unless the court determines a defendant does not have the ability to pay," as not creating a requirement that the court determine ability to pay prior to its order. The court noted that if the legislature had wanted to require a determination of ability to pay prior to its order, it could have used the words "provided" or "subject to" instead of "unless".

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 (<u>Id</u>. emphasis supplied) Because those words were not used, the court affirmed a fine imposed without determination of defendants ability to pay. Unlike the statute at issue <u>McMahan</u>, Government Code Section 13967, Subd. (a) uses the language, <u>"subject to"</u> bringing it in the requirement of assessment of ability to pay contemplated, but not present in <u>McMahan</u>.

Further, the amount of the fines at issue in Penal Code Section 290, (\$100) - (\$200) was noted by the McMahan court as being sufficiently de minus so that the legislature might have chosen not to burden the courts with the requirement to determine ability to pay before ordering them. In contrast, fines imposed under Section 13967, Subd. (a) may involve sums as large as (\$10,00), so extension of McMahan logic compels conclusion that the legislature intended to include in the statutes a requirement of prior determination of ability to pay. It could be argued that if the court imposes the minimum fine of (\$200), it need not ascertain ability to pay. However, in only citable case interpreting Section 13967, Subd. (a), [People v Frye (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 1483], the Third District held that, "even the imposition of the minimum fine must be subject to a defendants ability to pay." [People v Frye, supra, 21 Cal. App].

- B) The imposition of a fine under a statute requiring a prior determination of a defendant's ability to pay is valid only where the court makes a required Express Determination on the record.

 For the reasons discussed above, Government Code Section 13967, Subd.
- (a) is a statute which requires a prior determination of ability to pay.

An examination of analogous statutes requiring such a determination demonstrate that fines imposed without such determination are <u>invalid</u>. Please see [People v Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal. App. 3d. 360, 372] no excuse for courts failure to determine whether Petitioner has the ability to pay a restitution fine pursuant to (Penal Code Section § 1203.1h); [People v Adams (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d. 705, 712-713] court erred in failing to determine whether appellant

had ability to pay pursuant to (Penal Code Section § 1203.1b). Moreover, the court's consideration of the ability to pay must be a matter of record in order to ensure that the court was aware of its discretion and exercised it, and to permit an appellate review, (see e.g.) [People v Goulart (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d. 71, 84][People v Ryan (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d. 189, 196] [People v Vournazos (1988) 198 Cal. App. 3d. 948, 957] In [People v Barker (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d. 921] The Court reversed a restitution fine imposed under pre-1984 version of Government Code Section § 13967, Subd. (a) because it appeared from the record that the trial court failed to consider the appellants ability to pay. [Id. at pg. 943) The record in Barker revealed discussion between the court and counsel indicating assumptions that appellant would be earning money in state prison and might even some day manage to obtain other money through a judgment or award. For instance, the prosecutor suggested that the appellant might pay a portion of the restitution with the money appellant earned in prison, and pay the rest following his release. Despite the court's acknowledgment that these in the record allowed an implication that the trial court had considered the defendant's ability to pay, in the absence of a clear determination by the court on the record, it held that "The more appropriate interpretation is that the trial court failed to determine the ability to pay and remand is therefore necessary to permit trial court to make this determination." (Id. at pp. 943-944) Not even the perfunctory level of discussion found inadequate in Barker occurred in Petitioners case.

C) Appellant did not waive his right to a determination of his ability to pay a restitution fine.

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In the case of [people v Castro (1994) 94 Cal. App. 4th 3569] this court examined the issue of waiver under section § 13967, Subd. (a). In Castro,

"We read <u>Blankenship</u> as holding the objections to the procedure followed by the sentencing court in making restitution orders are waived by failure to raise them in trial court, but a claim that the sentencing court has exceeded its statutory power to impose a restitution fine may be raised for the first time on appeal." (<u>Id</u>. citing) [People v Neal (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 1120]

Castro holds as follows:

"The courts power to impose a fine pursuant to Government Code Section 13967, Subd. (a) is thus limited by statutory language. It follows that if there is no evidence of information before the court supporting a finding of ability to pay, the court has exceeded its statutory power of imposing the fine. Thus, we hold the appellant did not waive his right to challenge the restitution order on the ground that it is unsupported by evidence of ability to pay."

Court. It distinguishes McMahan is unlike Section § 13967. It does not use the words, "Subject to" and thus a finding of ability to pay was not statutorily required as it is in cases decided under Section § 13967.

Petitioner is aware that in [People v Schenck (1994) 23 Cal. App. 4th 698] the Third District held that a failure to raise the ability to pay issue in

Trial Court waives it on appeal. This case is irreconcilable with <u>Castro</u>. Wherefore, for all the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully moves this court find that the court erred in imposing a (\$5,00) five thousand dollar restitution fine without considering his ability to pay and that this portion of the judgment requires reversal. Please refer to sentencing transcript pages (639-640). (Exhibit C.)

PETITIONER BELIEVES THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY HEARING PETITIONERS APPEAL IN LIEU OF NEUTRAL JUDGE FROM THE APPELLATE COURT IN CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT § 41.35

V

Petitioner would ask the District Court to hold an evidentiary hearing under California Rules of Court Section § 41.35 whereas the Presiding Judge of the Trial Court ruled on Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus on Appeal. Petitioner would ask also that there be an evidentiary hearing on abuse of discretion by the Placer County Superior Court in failing to notify Petitioner of order returned to sender on Petitioner's Appeal. There was no effort to readdress the order by the court with the correct address and resend the order to Petitioner. Return to sender notified the Clerk of what was missing in the proper address and Petitioner's CDC number was on the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner is under a requirement to meet standards of time on response and ask the District Court to forego the constraint under Petitioners circumstance as a prisoner in California Department of Corrections. Please refer to, [Griffith v Kentuchey (1987) 479 U.S. 314][People v Murtshow (1989) 48 C. 3d. 1001, 1013, 258 CR. 821] Exhibit D Attached.

Dated: 1/-/7 - 07

Respectfully Submitted,

Alvin Scott Flowers, T-9132

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS T-91323 SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON FACILITY B, BLDG. 5 - 131 P.O. BOX 1050 SOLEDAD, CA 93960-1050

In Pro Per

ALVIN SCOTTFLOWERS

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CASE NO:

AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IN THE FOREGOING ATTACHED MATTER

Respondent,

Petitioner,

MICHAEL EVANS, WARDEN, ET, AL.

I, Alvin Scott Flowers hereby move this Court for leave to file and proceed in the foregoing and attached action(s) without prepayment of fees, costs or security htereof.

IN SUPPORT OF MY APPLICATION, I DECLARE:

- I am unable to pay cost of said action including cost of 1. duplication, or give security due to the fact that I am indigent and incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison, Soledad, California and am unable to earn or otherwise obtain the funding required to prosecute the aforementioned cause of action successfully.
 - The nature of the attached action is briefly as follows:

0.00.

For all the foregoing reasons, I pray this court grant this action and or motion, permitting me to proceed IN FORMA PAUPERIS with the attached motion(s).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Executed this // day of // 2007 at Salinas Valley State Prison, in Monterey County California.

Alvin Scott Flowers T-91323 Petitioner, IN PRO PER

VERIFICATION

I, Alvin Scott Flowers , State:

I am the petitioner in this action, I have read the foregoing writ of Habeas Corpus, Convict. Sen. and the facts stated therein are true of my knowledge, except as to matters that are therein stated on my own information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON

on	// -	1	2007.
OIL			

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS Petitioner

T-91323

State ID Number

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I Alvin Scott Flowers DECLARE:

That I am over the age of 18, and a party to the herein cause of action, and that I reside at Salinas Valley State Prison, Soledad, California in Monterey County.

My Mailing Address is:

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS T-91323 SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON FACILITY B, BLDG. 5 - 131 P.O. BOX 1050 SOLEDAD, CA 93960-1050

On $\frac{1}{2007}$ 2007, I delivered to Prison Officials for mailing the following legal documents:

WRIT OF HABBAS CORPUS, CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

In a sealed envelope by delivery to Prison Housing Officers, to be placed into the inmate legal mail in accordance with the Supreme Court Case; [Houston B. Lack, (1988) 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379]. and address to:

CLERK OF THE COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN 450 GOLDEN GATE AVENUE SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Executed at Salinas Valley State Prison, Soledad, California

on<u>//-/7</u> 20₀₇

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS

Petitioner, In Pro Per

EXHIBIT A

Preliminary Hearing Transcripts

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Trial Transcripts

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the preliminary examination in this case. Both sides ready to 1 2 proceed? MR. GINI: Yes, your Honor. 3 MR. KLEIN: Yes, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Are there any motions to be made before we 5 talk about some stipulations? All right. Hearing no motions, 6 I understand there were a few stipulations for purposes of 7 preliminary examination. My understanding is that for purposes 8 of preliminary examination only that the defense was willing to 9 stipulate to a blood alcohol taken at a .18 for Mr. Flowers 10 some short period of time after the automobile wreck. 11 MR. GINI: Your Honor, I believe what the stipulation is 12 that Jon Knapp is deemed to have testified the blood alcohol 13 that was taken more than two hours after the crash is a .18. 14 And that if Jon Knapp were to testify, he would indicate that 15 the defendant's alcohol at the time of driving would have been 16 above a .20. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Klein, for purposes of preliminary 18 examination? 19 MR. KLEIN: I agree that's what Mr. Knapp would have 20 testified to, and I will so stipulate. 21 THE COURT: All right. Also I understand there was a 22 stipulation as to great bodily injury as to certain victims. 23 MR. GINI: Yes, your Honor. They are alleged in one 24 count at this point. We reserve the option to break them out 25 into separate counts, the multiple victims in the case, along 26 with the decedent -- we'll get to that stipulation in a 27 moment -- along with the decedent, as well as Jonathan Lamb and

Betty Daily, and the stipulation for purposes of the prelim is that they received great bodily injury as a result of this collision.

MR. KLEIN: We had a discussion about this in chambers. I think what I told Mr. Gini prior to going into chambers is that I was going to stipulate to all medical records and not have an issue with that. My read of the medical records does not indicate GBI with those two people. Mr. Gini has assured me that if it does not appear on better review of the medical records to be a GBI situation with those two victims, he won't go forward with that, and I have full confidence in Mr. Gini in that regard.

For the purposes of this hearing, I'll let that go. I thought what I was stipulating to really was that the people suffered injuries, not that it was great bodily injury, because my reading of those reports, I'll let that go for the purposes of this hearing. I don't think that is critical in the case in that we have a Three Strikes case.

And the other stipulation I think we're going to get to next is that one of the occupants of the vehicle, in fact, died as a result of this accident, and I will stipulate that the accident was the cause of death and that she was in the car.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then for purposes of preliminary examination only, are you willing to just allow the Court to find GBI as to Lamb and Daily with the understanding, of course, that more work will be done with regard to the actual injuries?

MR. KLEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And you join in the stipulation, 1 2 Mr. Gini? MR. GINI: Yes, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Appreciate that. I understand the 4 agreement and certainly if they're not there, they're not 5 6 there. MR. GINI: That's correct. 7 THE COURT: Next stipulation as to the decedent in the 8 9 case? MR. GINI: Your Honor, if the Court pleases, we could 10 mark the report that was prepared by Dr. Henrikson, the 11 pathologist for the County, which sets forth the cause of 12 death. I could ask that be marked and received into evidence, 13 and it recites the cause of death in there, the multiple blunt 14 force trauma. 15 THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Klein, for 16 purposes of the preliminary examination? 17 No. MR. KLEIN: 18 THE COURT: Let's have that report marked as number 1 for 19 identification. Mr. Klein, you also have a copy of that? 20 MR. KLEIN: Yes, I do, your Honor. -21 THE COURT: Be marked as number 1 and admitted into 22 evidence by stipulation, gentlemen? 23 MR. GINI: Yes, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Klein? 25 MR. KLEIN: Stipulated. 26 THE COURT: All right. Stipulated into evidence. 27 1/1/ 28 б

(Exhibit No. 1 was marked and received 1 into evidence.) 2 THE COURT: Any other stipulations entered into at this 3 time? 4 MR. GINI: The only other discussion, your Honor, was 5 about prior convictions and so forth, and I'd indicated to the 6 Court the preference to file an information after today's 7 hearing and obviously have the opportunity to make adjustment 8 where necessary with regard to what's proved here at the prelim 9 and with regard to prior convictions if we learn anything 10 different about them. 11 THE COURT: All right. Understood. Thank you. And who 12 would be your first witness, please? 13 MR. GINI: People call California Highway Patrol Traffic 14 Officer Herbert. 15 16 JEFFREY HERBERT 17 called as a witness on behalf of the People herein was sworn, 18 examined, and testified as follows: 19 THE COURT: Please come forward. Good morning. 20 OFFICER HERBERT: Morning, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Please raise your right hand, sir. 22 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 23 give in this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and 24 nothing but the truth, so help you God? 25 THE WITNESS: I do. 26 THE COURT: Please state your name and spell your last. 27 Jeffrey Herbert, H-e-r-b-e-r-t. THE WITNESS: 7 28

EXHIBIT B Preliminary Hearing transcripts

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Trial Transcripts

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either passenger or driver of the car.

However, I remind the Court that the officers testified that there was significant intrusion into the traffic -- into the passenger compartment in the driver's side rear seat which is where all the witnesses say Rennea Hernandez was seated. One officer stated that kind of intrusion would be responsible for a significant injury. She is the deceased party here.

The Court has an indication from the autopsy report as to the extent of her injuries. Moreover, the injuries that were received by the driver are more on the right-hand side and do not indicate that intrusion would have been near where he was seated. So the weight of that evidence also supports that he was driving the vehicle.

As far as the rest, I believe there's a stipulation and the People's burden has been sustained as to Count One, Count Two, and Three.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Klein?

MR. KLEIN: Submit it.

THE COURT: All right. Pursuant to the various stipulations as to blood alcohol, great bodily injury to the victims for the purposes of preliminary examination, and in considering Item Number 1, which was basically the coroner's report with regard to the deceased person, Rennea Hernandez, the Court does find that there's sufficient cause to believe Count One, Two, and Three have been committed by this defendant, and that the defendant may be guilty thereof.

Therefore, he is held to answer for those. Also as to the allegation of bodily injury to more than one victim, and in a 118

special allegation of great bodily injury as alleged at page 3. 1 It is my understanding that both sides have requested 2 this be set over for the purpose of allowing the district 3 attorney to file an information in approximately ten days. 4 That's correct. MR. GINI: 5 THE COURT: All right. I will do that. I intend to go 6 ahead and set this in Department 13 for arraignment. 7 MR. KLEIN: Your Honor, I was just going to ask that 8 perhaps if -- since you heard the preliminary hearing, if we 9 could, in fact, set it here and maybe discuss the case. 10 THE COURT: I'm not going to do the arraignment, but if 11 you would like to discuss it after I set it for arraignment 12 today, I'd be happy to discuss it with you. 13 MR. KLEIN: That's fine. Could you set it, though, in 14 Judge O'Flaherty's courtroom? 15 THE COURT: I'm not going to do that because that causes 16 transportation issues. If it is only for an arraignment, I 17 want to set it in Department 13 on a day that you are there or 18 Mr. --19 I don't ever go to 13. That's just why -- I MR. KLEIN: 20 work out of Judge O'Flaherty's court that's why I asked that. 21 THE COURT: We all know what Judge O'Flaherty's court 22 looks like most days. That's why I am setting it in 13. 23 That's fine. MR. KLEIN: 24 What day would be most convenient for either THE COURT: 25 of you, Monday/Tuesday or Thursday/Friday? 26 MR. GINI: I think Monday afternoon is convenient. 27 Monday morning, that's fine too. 119 28

That will be fine. How about we set this for THE COURT: 1 Monday, December 10th, 8:30 in Department 13 for arraignment. 2 That will be the order for today. I'm going to order the items 3 of evidence may be returned for the proffering parties for 4 Again, gentlemen, if you wish to discuss the case safekeeping. 5 at this time, I'd be happy to do so with you. And even in the 6 future if we can work out a time, I'll -- if I have time to do 7 that, I'll be happy to do that. The defendant is remanded to 8 the custody of the sheriff on the bail as set. 9 (Proceedings concluded at 3:30 p.m.) 10 (Nothing omitted.) 11 --000--12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 120

THE COURT: The record will reflect we're out of the presence of the jury. A couple of matters I want to attend do at this point.

I will indicate for the record a stipulation that the Court and counsel have settled the instructions prior to the Court's delivery and the instructs as read are a stipulated set of instructions by both sides reflecting all tactical considerations to the extent the instructions are given or not given unless at this time counsel has any exception to that stipulation to state on the record.

Mr. Tellman?

MR. TELLMAN: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Klein?

MR. KLEIN: No.

THE COURT: We now have left the question of the prior convictions. Have you made a decision as to whether any evidence needs to be presented or an admission?

MR. KLEIN: We're not going there.

THE COURT: In what sense?

MR. KLEIN: We're not going to have them make that decision, at least from my perspective right now.

THE COURT: At one o'clock be prepared to present my evidence. I'll deal with it one way or the other. One o'clock, when the jury comes in. It's very difficult to conclude it at that point, so I want to take care of this --

MR. KLEIN: Can I talk to my client real briefly about that?

THE COURT: Sure.

1 (Conference between counsel and 2 the defendant.) MR. KLEIN: I've discussed it with my client, and if we 3 reach that portion of the trial, he will admit the prior 4 5 convictions. 6 THE COURT: Well, I really want to take care of it now. Basically, Mr. Flowers, the way it works, your admission 7 of the prior convictions has no legal effect whatsoever if 8 9 you're found not guilty. But if you are found guilty, obviously, it will affect the ultimate disposition in the case. 10 The reason I want to take care of it now, sometimes this gets 11 12 overlooked and I don't want it overlooked. And it's difficult at the end of the case after the jury has returned a verdict to 13 do it because the jurors wants to talk to the lawyers and 14 lawyers want to talk to lawyers, and it creates a problem. 15 16 If you want it to talk this over with your attorney, I'll put this over to one o'clock and hear the evidence or take your 17 admissions at that point. I want to take go care of it 18 19 sometime or other. 20 If you need more time to talk to Mr. Klein, I'll be happy to give it you. I want to take care of it at this stage of the 21 22 trial. 23 (Conference between counsel and 24 the defendant.) MR. KLEIN: He's indicated he wants to take care of it 25 26 I'm assuming he wants to admit the prior convictions. 27 THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple of other questions, 28 Mr. Flowers.

You should understand that a trial on the prior convictions has the same rights as a trial on the principle case. So you have waived your right to a jury trial on the issue of the prior convictions, but you have the right for me to receive evidence and to have a trial on whether or not you were actually convicted of the prior serious felony conviction.

At that trial phase, you have the right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses that would be called.

You have the right to bring into court any witnesses or evidence that might help your case.

And also have the right to remain silent.

Do you understand all of that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

17.

THE COURT: You also need to understand that the consequences of your admissions, as as I indicated earlier, if you admit the prior convictions at this stage of the trial but are found not guilty of the principle crimes, then it will have no effect on on you whatsoever. You'll walk out of the courtroom.

If, however, you are found guilty of any one of the felonies and three prior serious felony convictions, the consequence of your admission at that point will mean that the Court will obligated as a matter of law to impose a sentence of no less than 25 years to life under the Three Strikes Law.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Having all this in mind, do you wish to admit the prior serious felony convictions?

1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 2 THE COURT: On or about June 6, '87, were you convicted of the crime of robbery in violation of Penal Code 211 in 3 4 Sonoma County? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 6 THE COURT: Also on June 6, '87, were you convicted of another count of robbery in violation of Penal Code 211 in 7 8 Sonoma County? 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: February 10th, '92, were you convicted of 10 residential burglary, a crime, out of Elko, Nevada, on that 11 12 date? 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Thank you very much. Also, I didn't address this, but I should address this as 15 16 well, an additional allegation. 17 You have three prior prison terms, the issues are the same. You have the right to a jury trial. 18 19 The right to a court trial. 20 The right to confront witnesses. 21 The right to bring in evidence. And the right to remain silent as to whether or not you 22 23 suffered the prior prison terms. Again, if you admit the prior prison terms, it has 24 absolutely no effect on you now. If you're found not guilty, 25 you still walk out of the courtroom. If, however, you are 26 found guilty of any of the principle offenses, then the law 27 specifies that each prior prison term adds one year to your 28

1 sentence. 2 So do you understand the rights I have given you? 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand the consequences? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 6 THE COURT: And do you wish to admit the prior prison 7 terms? 8 MR. KLEIN: Could I have one question with him right now. 9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 (Conference between counsel and the 11 defendant.) 12 MR. KLEIN: Go ahead, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Tellman, there is one aspect of the prior 14 prison terms that I'm going to reserve on if necessary to the 15 time of sentencing. I note that one prior prison term is October 12th, '82, and the next prior prison term is 16 January 6th, '87. That is presumptively washed out, so I'll 17 18 take the admission only and it will only have bearing if you 19 can establish that he was, in fact, in prison custody somewhere in there, within the five-year window. 20 21 Otherwise, it will be of no consequence. 22 MR. TELLMAN: Absolutely. 23 THE COURT: With respect to a prison term that started on 24 or about October 12th, '82, for vehicle theft in Sonoma County, 25 do you admit that prior prison term? 26 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 27 THE COURT: The next prior prison term is January 6, '87, 28 for the crime of robbery out of Sonoma County.

```
Do you admit that prior prison term?
    1
    2
              THE DEFENDANT:
                               Yes.
    3
              THE COURT: The residential burglary prison term that you
        served in Elko, Nevada, starting February 10th, '92.
    4
              Do you admit that prior prison term?
   5
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
   6
   7
             THE COURT: Thank you very much.
   8
             Unless there's anything else, counsel, we'll adjourn, and
       we just need to now how to get a hold of you.
   9
  10
  11
                                   (Proceedings concluded.)
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Either side wish to poll the jury with THE COURT: 1 respect to Count Two? 2 3 MR. TELLMAN: No. MR. KLEIN: No. 4 5 THE COURT: The clerk will record the verdict. Verdict with respect to Count Three: 6 "We, the jury in the above-entitled action find the 7 defendant, Alvin Scott Flowers, guilty of a violation of 8 California Vehicle Code Section 23153(b), driving with .08 percent of blood alcohol causing jury, a felony, as charged in 10 Count Three of the First Amended Information." 11 Dated: January 30, 2003; signed by the foreperson. 12 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is this your verdict 13 with respect to Count Three? 14 15 JURY: Yes. THE COURT: Either side wish to poll the jury with 16 respect to Count Three? 17 18 MR. TELLMAN: No. MR. KLEIN: No, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Alligation with respect to great bodily 20 21 injury: "We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find the 22 allegation that the defendant, Alvin Scott Flowers, caused 23 death to victim, to wit., Rennea Marie Hernandez, within the 24 meaning of Vehicle Code 23558 as alleged in the Information to 25 be true." 26 January 30, 2003; signed by the foreperson. 27

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is this your verdict

624

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with respect to your special allegation?
1
          JURY:
                  Yes.
2
          THE COURT: Either side wish to poll the jury with
3
    respect to this allegation?
 4
                         No.
          MR. TELLMAN:
 5
          MR. KLEIN:
 6
          THE COURT: Second allegation with respect to great
7
    bodily injury:
8
          "We, the jury in the above-entitled action find the
9
    allegation that the defendant, Alvin Scott Flowers, caused
10
    great bodily injury" -- and it should be simply "caused injury
11
    to the victim, " -- Jonathan Ted Lamb, witin the meaning of
12
    Vehicle Code Section 23558, as alleged in the Complaint to be
13
     true."
14
          Dated -- undated. I'll fill in the current date of
15
     1/30/03; signed by the foreperson.
16
          Ladies and gentlemen of this jury, is this your verdict
17
    with respect to the second allegation?
18
           JURY:
                  Yes.
19
          THE COURT: Either side wish to poll the jury with
20
     respect to this allegation?
21
          MR. KLEIN:
                       No.
22
          MR. TELLMAN: No.
23
          THE COURT: And a third special allegation:
24
           "We, the jury in the above-entitled action find the
25
     allegation that the defendant, Alvin Scott Flowers, again
26
     caused injury to victim, to wit., Betty Louise Dailey, within
27
     the meaning of Vehicle Code Section 23558, as alleged in the
28
                                                                  625
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Complaint to be true."

Again, undated. I will date the form January 30th, 2003. Signed by the foreperson.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is this your verdict with respect to the third special allegation?

JURY: Yes.

THE COURT: Either side wish to pole the jury with respect to this allegation?

MR. KLEIN: No.

MR. TELLMAN: No.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this now completes your service in this case. I want to publicly thank you for that. This now frees you -- by reaching verdicts in this case, it now frees you of the admonition not to talk about the case. You can talk to anyone you wish to about the case, your spouse, your friends, your co-workers. You can talk to the lawyers about the case or someone from their offices.

At times attorneys do follow up on the verdict and it's fair to comment, if you wish, on all aspects of the case, how you reached your decision, what was important, what was unimportant, all of that.

It's also your privilege not to talk about the case if you don't wish to.

You may not be compelled to give any information about the case if you choose not to. It's the obligation of anyone contacting you about the case to set a reasonable time and circumstance about any conversation. And if anyone acts inappropriately in your judgment, you're to inform the Court

EXHIBIT C

Sentencing Transcripts

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stayed under the provisions of Penal Code Section 654.

The defendant having admitted -- having established that there are three prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5(b) the defendant is ordered to serve three years determinant consecutive to the life terms and other determinate terms.

Accordingly, the sentence imposed in this case is the effective term of 35 years to life.

To be given credit to the defendant is 598 actual time, 89 days conduct for a total of 687 days.

The defendant is to pay a restitution fine of \$5,000 under Penal Code Section 1202.4(b) and an additional restitution fine \$5,000 under Penal Code Section 1202.45.

Mr. Flowers, it is also my duty at this point to advise you, you have the right to appeal the judgment of this Court. If you wish to file an appeal you must do so within 60 days of today's date. If Mr. Klein has not filed it for you then it is your obligation to file that notice of appeal. It is filed with this Court. Not the Court of appeal.

It is your responsibility to designate what you're appealing from, whether the judgment of this Court or entire record of this Court. If you wish to appeal the decision of this Court you have the right to the assistance of an attorney on appeal. And if you don't have funds to hire your own then one will be appointed to you. You also are entitled to free transcripts of the trial court proceedings. It is your obligation to keep the appealate court notified

of your whereabouts if you do file a notice of appeal.

You understand the rights I have just explained to
you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

part of this judgment and sentence that you may be released on parole after expiration of the term of imprisonment just imposed unless the Board of Prison Terms waives parole for good cause. The period of parole shall not exceed five years unless parole is suspended and you are returned to custody for violation of parole. In that event, the period under parole supervision or in custody shall not exceed 24 months from the date of the initial parole. However, if you abscond any period following suspension or revocation of parole until you are returned to custody shall not apply to the limits on the parole term.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff to be delivered to the Department of Corrections upon preparation of the abstract.

(Whereupon the matter was concluded.)

---000---

EXHIBIT D

1	ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS, T91323 Salinas Valley State Prison	
2	Facility B, Bldg. 5-131	
3	P.O.Box 1050 Soledad, Calif. 93960-1050	
4	In Pro Per,	
5	IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
6	IN AND FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT	
7 .		
8	ALVIN S. FLOWERS }	
9	Petitioner, CASE NO: CO44333 WHC 700	
10.	v) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	
11	PEOPLE OF THE STATE (CONVICTION AND SENTENCE	
12	OF CALIFORNIA (Respondent,)	
13		
143		
15	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	
16	and Brief and Exhibits in Support Thereof	
17	Petitioner Alvin Scott Flowers respectfully submits this	
18	Petition to the Appellate Court in answer to an Order of Denial by	
19	the Placer County Superior Court. Mr. Flowers asks the court for	
20	review at the Appellate Court on his Superior Court Case Number:	
21	62-23894 of Placer County. The following brief and exhibits in	
	support thereof for Petitioners request for review to ask for an	

order to show cause on issues therein rasied in said petition in

accordance to the California Rules of Court and in compliance with

the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third District.

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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SUSAN E. WELSH

December 21, 2006

Alvin Scott Flowers T-91323 Salinas Valley State Prison P. O. Box 1050 Soledad, CA 93960-1050

Dear Mr. Flowers:


This court is in receipt of your petition for writ of habeas corpus. I am unable to locate a verification with an original signature. Therefore, I have been instructed to return the petition to you. I am enclosing a judicial form for filing habeas petitions. Please return your petition on this form and sign where indicate with the flag.

Very truly yours,

DEENA C. FAWCETT Clerk/Administrator

By: DARLENE A. WARNOCK Supervising Deputy Clerk

H. Warrock



Superior Court
County of Placer
Siste of California

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS, T91323 Salinas Valley State Prison Facility B, Bldg. 5-131 P.O.Box 1050 2 Soledad, Calif. 93960-1050 3 In Pro Per, 4 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 6 IN AND FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT 8 ALVIN S. FLOWERS Petitioner, 9 CASE NO: C044333 WHC 700 10. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 11 PEOPLE OF THE STATE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE OF CALIFORNIA 12 Respondent, 13 143

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

and Brief and Exhibits in Support Thereof

Petitioner Alvin Scott Flowers respectfully submits this Petition to the Appellate Court in answer to an Order of Denial by the Placer County Superior Court. Mr. Flowers asks the court for review at the Appellate Court on his Superior Court Case Number: 62-23894 of Placer County. The following brief and exhibits in support thereof for Petitioners request for review to ask for an order to show cause on issues therein rasied in said petition in accordance to the California Rules of Court and in compliance with the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third District.

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Cleric Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District

Name ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS Address SALINAS VALLEY STATE PRISON P.O. BOX 1050 B-1-131 SOLEDAD, CA 93960-1050 CDC or ID Number T-91323

MC-275

SUPREME COURT FILED

MAY - 3 2007

Frederick K. Ohlrich Clerk

THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (Court)

Deputy

ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS Petitioner

MICHAEL EVANS, WARDEN, ET, AL.

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

No. C044333/WHC 700 - 6223894

(To be supplied by the Clerk of the Court)

S152382

INSTRUCTIONS—READ CAREFULLY

- If you are challenging an order of commitment or a criminal conviction and are filing this petition in the Superior Court, you should file it in the county that made the order.
- If you are challenging the conditions of your confinement and are filing this petition in the Superior Court,
- Read the entire form before answering any questions.
- This petition must be clearly handwritten in ink or typed. You should exercise care to make sure all answers are true and correct. Because the petition includes a verification, the making of a statement that you know is false may result in a conviction
- Answer all applicable questions in the proper spaces. If you need additional space, add an extra page and indicate that your
- If you are filing this petition in the Superior Court, you need file only the original unless local rules require additional copies.
- If you are filing this petition in the Court of Appeal, file the original and four copies of the petition and, if separately bound, one copy
- If you are filing this petition in the California Supreme Court, file the original and ten copies of the petition and, if separately bound,
- Notify the Clerk of the Court in writing if you change your address after filing your petition.
- In most cases, the law requires service of a copy of the petition on the district attorney, city attorney, or city prosecutor. See Penal Code section 1475 and Government Code section 72193. You may serve the copy by mail.

Approved by the Judicial Council of California for use under Rule 60 of the California Rules of Court [as amended effective January 1, 2005]. Subsequent amendments to Rule 60 may change the number of copies to be furnished to the Supreme

Form Approved by the Judicial Council of California MC-275 (Rev. July 1 2005)

S152382

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

In re ALVIN SCOTT FLOWERS on Habeas Corpus

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

SUPREME COURT
FILED

SEP 1 9 2007

Frederick K. Ohlrich Clerk

Deputy

GEORGE

Chief Justice